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CASE NOTES
alternatively gives consent to be sued) 24 because the non-resident must be
deemed to understand the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal courts and
state courts, and to be prepared to answer in either. That anyone may ex-
pressly waive his personal immunity is beyond argument, 25 but that he
may do so by implication is not conceived in the present case and its
several predecessors. 26
There are, however, some District courts and one Court of Appeals
which have had no hesitancy in applying the rule in the Neirbo case to the
cases in point, and finding that the defendant waived his privilege by sub-
mission through conduct. Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co. 27 held that the
out-of-state motorists had consented to be sued in Pennsylvania, and that
the District Court was in Pennsylvania. Kostamo v. Brorby28 found that by
the mere use of a Nebraska road, the non-resident motorist waived the fed-
eral rule. There are many cases to the same effect.29
In Jacobson v. Schuman,"° it was said:
To say that the court may retain jurisdiction [if justice requires] even though
the venue is improper, would stretch section 1391 too far. But this is what the
courts have done through legal fiction, [which] is dangerous in a country of
realistic men and women.31
It is submitted that the final determination of this split of opinion in the
federal courts is not the most pressing matter deserving resolution by the
Supreme Court of the United States but until it is resolved much needless
litigation will result.
CARRIERS-DUTY OF CARRIER TO NOTIFY CON-
SIGNOR OF NON-DELIVERY IN "ORDER-
NOTIFY" SITUATION
Plaintiff-consignor brought an action based on counts in tort and breach
of contract against the terminal carrier of goods shipped on an "order-
notify" bill of lading for failure of the carrier to notify consignor of
24 "Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be conceived negatively as a
waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary prefer-
ence." Ibid., at 168.
2562 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1406 (b) (1950).
26 Cases cited note 3 supra.
27 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa., 1953).
28 95 F. Supp. 806 (D.C. Nebr., 1951).
29 Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 201 F. 2d 582 (C.A. 6th, 1953); Garcia v.
Frausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo., 1951); Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa.,
1950); Canright v. General Finance Corp., 33 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ill., 1940).
80 105 F. Supp. 483 (D.C. Vt., 1952).
31 Ibid., at 486.
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non-acceptance of the goods by the "notify-party" who was consignor's
customer. The goods were subsequently destroyed by fire in carrier's
freight-house.' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the carrier's failure to notify consignor constituted a breach of contract,
but the court refused to decide whether the carrier's duty to notify was
absolute or was dependent on the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Lapp Insulator Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 112 N.E. 2d 359 (Mass., 1953).
There are many cases dealing with the problem of a carrier's duty to
notify a consignor of non-delivery of goods.2 These cases, however, do
not deal with the "order-notify" situation of the Lapp case, but are
usually concerned with the more ordinary shipping situation where a
seller of goods is the consignor, and the purchaser is the consignee under
a straight bill of lading. The rules differ with the various factual situa-
tions, but even a cursory examination of authorities reveals that the de-
cisions are not in harmony.8
Few cases have been decided wherein the plaintiff-consignor in an
"order-notify" situation has brought action against a carrier for failure
to give notice of non-delivery.4 The ability of the consignor to maintain
his action is derived from the broad language of the "Carmack Amend-
ment" of the Federal Interstate Commerce Act.5
Three distinct theories have evolved from those cases concerned with
the "order-notify" shipping situation: (1) There is no duty placed by
common law on the carrier to notify the consignor of non-acceptance
by the "notify-party,"' (2) There is an absolute duty to so notify,7 (3)
1 The goods were originally transported by Baltimore & Ohio R.R., but during the
course of transportation the defendant became the delivering or "terminal" carrier.
The "order-notify" shipping situation arises when a shipper consigns goods on a bill
of lading to his own order, with instructions to the carrier to notify a designated
party, who is usually the shipper's customer, upon arrival of the goods at their desti-
nation. The customer or "notify-party" can then obtain the goods by paying a sight
draft which is forwarded from the shipper's bank to the customer's bank, and re-
ceiving the bill of lading which has been indorsed by the shipper.
2 Duty to Notify Consignor When Consignee, or Person to be Notified, Refuses
to Accept Goods, 4 A.L.R. 1285 (1919).
3 Ibid. It is interesting to note that where the shipper is not the consignee and the
goods are not delivered, the majority of courts seem to place a duty on the carrier
to notify the shipper and to hold the goods subject to the shipper's order.
4 "It would appear from an examination of the decisions elsewhere that there is not
a great deal of authority on the question here presented..." Lapp Insulator Co. v.
Boston & M. R. R., 112 N.E. 2d 359, 362 (Mass., 1953).
5 Interstate Commerce Act Sec. 1 (1) (a), (3), 20 (11); 49 U.S.C.A. 1 (1) (a),
(3), 20 (11). The cases generally refer to this act by the more popular name of "The
Carmack Amendment."
6 Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 F. 2d 371 (C.A. 3d, 1934).
Hardin v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 134 Mo. App. 681, 114 S.W. 1117 (1908).
7 Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Nav. Co., 84 Ore. 399, 165 Pac.
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Whether there is a duty depends upon the surrounding facts and circum-
stances.
8
The courts that have held to the "no duty" theory, seem to base their
decisions on the fact that consignor and consignee were the same party.
The court in Trinidad Bean & Elevator Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. 9 points
out that because of this fact, plaintiff-consignor could not help but know
that the goods were not delivered, and hence the carrier was under no
duty to give notice. The court intimated that its decision would be other-
wise if the "notify-party" were a "consignee." The opinion in Beedy v.
Pacey,10 a similar case but not involving an "order-notify" situation, went
even further and held that there not only was no duty on the carrier to
give notice, but that the consignor had "abandoned" the goods when his
"agent" refused to accept delivery. In the Beedy case, consignee and
consignor were the same party, but the shipment was not on an "order-
notify" bill of lading. It is interesting to note that the court in the Beedy
case failed to cite previous cases or precedent. In Samuel Hardin Grain
Co. v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 11 the "agency" thinking of the Beedy de-
cision was carried one step further when the court declared:
As between the parties to the contract, Blackwell [notify-party] was the
agent of plaintiffs [consignor] for the purpose of receiving these notices, and
notice to him was notice to plaintiffs. 12
The courts holding to the "absolute duty" theory, follow a line of rea-
soning enunciated in Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Oregon-Wash. R.R. &
Navigation Co.13 wherein it was said:
The common law principle is that in such case the carrier is charged with
the duty of ordinary care and diligence for the protection of the property
of the owner.14
The "absolute duty" cases hold such ordinary care means the giving of
notice of non-delivery by the carrier. These cases, as well as similar cases
not involving the "order-notify" situation, have further held that such
363 (1917); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co., 150 Ky.
333, 150 S.W. 321 (1912); Emerson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 120 Minn.
84, 138 N.W. 1026 (1912).
8Tri-State Produce Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 104 F. Supp. 452
(N.D. Iowa, 1952); Porter v. Pennsylvania R.R., 217 App. Div. 49, 215 N.Y.S. Supp. 727
(S.Ct., 1926).
9 72 F. 2d 371 (C.A. 3d, 1934).
10 22 Wash. 94, 60 Pac. 56 (1900).
11 134 Mo. App. 681, 114 S.W. 1117 (1908).
12 Tbid., at 682 and 1118.
1384 Ore. 399, 165 Pac. 363 (1917).
14 Ibid., at 400 and 364-5.
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,ordinary care means the carrier becomes liable as a warehouseman if the
goods are not accepted or delivered. 15 The reasoning in Nashville, Chatt.
& St. Louis R.R. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co. 6 emphasized the fact that the
consignor was still the owner of the goods after shipping under the
"order-notify" bill of lading. The court expressly stated:
... that, where the consignee refuses to accept the goods, the carrier must
notify the consignor of this fact if the bill of lading is sufficient to show that
he is the owner of the goods.17
The Stoddard decision pointed out that the whole "order-notify"
method of shipping was simply a security device to protect the consignor
from the -insolvency of his customer, and said:
The purpose of shipping in this manner is plain; it is the intention of the
shipper in every such case to exact payment of the purchase price of the
goods on delivery'18
These cases, thus, look beyond the apparent fact that consignor and
consignee are listed as the same party on the bill of lading, and instead
indicate the purpose of employing this method of shipping, namely, to
protect the consignor. This is a powerful and logical argument that gains
importance when it is pointed out that the carriers fully understand the
purpose and effect of "order-notify" bills of lading.' 9 The absolute duty
cases would seem to extend the protection offered to the consignor, since,
by requiring the carrier to give notice of non-acceptance, the consignor
is doubly protected; first, by the fact that the "order-notify" bill of
lading system of shipping requires the purchaser to make payment before
delivery, and second, by the fact that the consignor can quickly repossess
the goods upon carrier's notice of non-acceptance by the purchaser. The
court in the instant case apparently approves this double protection:
Where the "notify party" does not accept the shipment it is not unreason-
able, we think, to require the terminal carrier to inform the shipper of that
fact so that he may take the necessary steps for the repossession, storage or
disposition of his property.20
15 9 Am. Jur. 768, 769.
16 I50 Ky. 333, 150 S.W. 321 (1912).
17 Ibid., at 335 and 322.
'8 Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Oregon-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 84 Ore. 399, 404,
165 Pac. 363, 366 (1917).
19 On this point, the court in the Stoddard case declared: "In the case at bar plain-
tiff proved without objection from the defendant a general custom to ship in this
manner, when the shipper is unwilling to extend credit to the purchaser by whom
the goods are ordered. The answer shows affirmatively that the purpose and effect
of shipping in this manner were understood by the defendant." Ibid.
2OLapp Insulator Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 112 N.E. 2d 359, 363 (Mass., 1953).
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The third theory is supported by decisions that find a duty to notify
only if the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case warrant such
a finding. Porter v. Pennsylvania R.R.,21 reversed a directed verdict and
held it was for a jury to decide if the defendant-carrier should have noti-
fied the plaintiff-consignor that a shipment of grapes was not immediately
accepted by the notify-party. The court in its opinion made an interesting
statement:
If he [notify-party] simply neglects to accept or unload the goods, but
promised to do so shortly or gives other indication of that purpose, the carrier
may be excused from giving immediate notice to the consignor.
22
It must be noted that in Tri-State Produce Co. v. Chicago, B. Q. & R.R.,23
the "notify-party" never actually refused the shipment, but like the
"notify-party" in the Porter case, simply did not unload the freight car
after being notified of arrival. The Tri-State case held that there was a
common law duty on the carrier to notify the consignor, whereas the
above statement of the Porter case seems to indicate there was no duty
to notify if a jury finds that the "notify-party" never led the carrier to
believe the shipment was refused.
This raises an interesting point in regard to the instant case. Here, the
"notify-party," i.e., Davis, did not refuse the shipment outright, as was
the situation in the Stoddard and Nashville cases, but actually promised
to pay for the goods as soon as able and accept the shipment if the de-
fendant-carrier would place the goods in his freight-house at Davis'
expense.24 Thus, while the Lapp case refused to decide whether the
carrier's duty was absolute as in the Stoddard case, or dependent on the
surrounding facts and circumstances as in the Porter case, it can be
readily argued on the carrier's behalf that if his duty was predicated on
the facts and circumstances, the "notify-party's" actions did not constitute
a refusal of the goods, and hence there was no duty to notify consignor
as placed on the carrier in accord with the Porter case statement. Need-
less to say, the question of what constitutes a refusal by the "notify-
party" and the effect of this upon the carrier's duty to notify consignor,
awaits clarification in future decisions.
25
21 217 App. Div. 49, 215 N.Y. Supp. 727 (S.Ct., 1926).
22 Ibid., at 56 and 734.
23 104 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Iowa, 1952).
24 The bills of lading provided: "Notify Davis Transformer Co., 297 No. State St.,
Concord, New Hampshire." The goods remained in the defendant's freight-house
almost three months before being destroyed by fire of undetermined origin.
25 9 American Jurisprudence 770 maintains that notice by the carrier to the con-
signor should not be deferred beyond the day following that on which the goods
are offered and refused by the purchaser. This is another point that awaits future
clarification.
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Obviously, there is a good deal of conflict in the decisions involving
an "order-notify" situation, but this conflict seems to arise from con-
fusion on the part of various courts. In following one of the three theories,
the courts usually rely on numerous cases dealing with similar facts but
not involving the "order-notify" situation, such as was done in the
Stoddard decision. This confusion and conflict could be readily resolved
by a clearcut decision by the United States Supreme Court, since nearly
all the cases involve a shipment in interstate commerce. Because the
United States Supreme Court has never decided the point the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court felt free in determining the matter according to its
own notions. 20 It could hardly be said that the Tri-State decision will
start a trend toward the "facts and circumstances" theory, or that the
United States Supreme Court will adopt any "duty" theory, despite the
statements of some courts. 27
It is submitted that, of the three theories, the "facts and circumstances"
theory is, perhaps, better suited to bring about substantial justice between
the parties involved in an "order-notify" situation. The rigidity and
curtness of the "absolute duty" and "no duty" rules can result in harsh
decisions in cases which, with our ever expanding and complex mercantile
structure, have a peculiar or at least singular factual background.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
Plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries suffered when his
automobile collided with a truck owned by the defendant. Judgment
was for the defendant on grounds of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, one facet of which was that plaintiff was driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, it was held that the
trial court did not err in its admission into evidence of hospital records
which referred to the plaintiff's alleged intoxication. The basis for
the decision was that the information as to intoxication was necessary
for proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient. Thus, the records were
admissible as "business entries" under the Connecticut Uniform Act on
26The court in the Lapp case declared: "Where the Supreme Court of the United
States has dealt with the question its decisions, of course, would be binding on this
court. But where-as is the case here-the decisions of that court furnish no guide
we are free to determine the appropriate rule to be applied, giving such consider-
ation to the decisions of lower Federal courts as we think they are entitled." Lapp
Insulator Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 112 N.E. 2d 359, 362 (Mass., 1953).
27 The Nashville decision recognized that there was conflict in the decisions con-
cerned with the "order-notify" situation, but the Nashville court decided to follow
the "absolute duty" theory, and added: "This rule has the approval of the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co., 150 Ky. 333, 335, 150 S.W. 321, 322 (1912).
